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Behavioral economics has been a growing force in many fields of applied economics, including public
economics, labor economics, health economics, and law and economics.  This paper describes and
assesses the current state of behavioral law and economics.  Law and economics had a critical (though
underrecognized) early point of contact with behavioral economics through the foundational debate
in both fields over the Coase theorem and the endowment effect.  In law and economics today, both
the endowment effect and other features of behavioral economics feature prominently and have been
applied in many important legal domains.  The paper concludes with reference to a new emphasis
in behavioral law and economics on "debiasing through law" - using existing or proposed legal structures









Many topics within economics relate to law.  A large body of work in public economics, 
for instance, examines the effects of legally-mandated government programs such as disability 
and unemployment insurance (Katz and Meyer 1990; Gruber 1994; Cutler and Gruber 1996; 
Autor and Duggan 2003); work on the labor market examines the effects of many types of 
antidiscrimination laws (Heckman and Payner 1989; Donohue and Heckman 1991; Acemoglu 
and Angrist 2001; Jolls 2004a); and recent corporate governance research studies the 
consequences of corporate and securities law on stock returns and volatility (Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick 2003; Ferrell 2003; Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen 2006).  But, while all of 
these topics relate to law in some way, neither “law and economics” nor “behavioral law and 
economics” embraces them as genuinely central areas of inquiry.  Thus an important threshold 
question for the present work involves how to characterize the domains of both “law and 
economics” and “behavioral law and economics.”   
Amid the broad span of economic topics relating to law in some way, a few distinctive 
features help to demarcate work that is typically regarded as within law and economics.  One 
distinguishing feature is that much of this work focuses on various areas of law that were not 
much studied by economists prior to the advent of law and economics; these areas include tort 
law, contract law, property law, and rules governing the litigation process.  A second feature of 
work within law and economics is that it often (controversially) employs the normative criterion 
of “wealth maximization” (R. Posner 1979) rather than that of social welfare maximization – not, 
for the most part, on the view that society should pursue the maximization of wealth rather than 
social welfare, but instead because law and economics generally favors addressing distributional 
issues that bear on social welfare solely through the tax system (Shavell 1981).  Finally, a third  
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distinguishing feature of much work within law and economics is its sustained interest in 
explaining and predicting the content, rather than just the effects, of legal rules.  While a large 
body of work in economics studies the effects of law (as noted above), outside of work 
associated with law and economics only political economy has generally given central emphasis 
to analyzing the content of law, and then only from a particular perspective.
1   
Given this rough sketch of “law and economics,” what then is “behavioral law and 
economics”?  Behavioral law and economics involves both the development and the 
incorporation within law and economics of behavioral insights drawn from various fields of 
psychology.  As has been widely recognized since the early work by Allais (1952) and Ellsberg 
(1961), some of the foundational assumptions of traditional economic analysis may reflect an 
unrealistic picture of human behavior.  Not surprisingly, models based on these assumptions 
sometimes yield erroneous predictions.  Behavioral law and economics attempts to improve the 
predictive power of law and economics by building in more realistic accounts of actors’ 
behavior. 
The present paper describes some of the central attributes and applications of behavioral 
law and economics to date; it also outlines an emerging focus in behavioral law and economics 
on prospects for “debiasing” individuals through the structure of legal rules (Jolls and Sunstein 
2006).  Through the vehicle of “debiasing through law,” behavioral law and economics may 
open up a new space within law and economics between, on the one hand, unremitting adherence 
to traditional economic assumptions and, on the other hand, broad structuring or restructuring of 
 
1 The three features of law and economics identified in the text are not meant to demarcate the intrinsic 
essence of the field; instead the claim is that these features characterize much of the existing work 
generally regarded as law and economics.  
3 
legal regimes on the assumption that people are inevitably and permanently bound to deviate 
from traditional economic assumptions.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 traces the development and refinement of one 
of the central insights of behavioral economics – that people frequently exhibit an endowment 
effect – both outside and within the field of behavioral law and economics.  Section 3 moves to a 
general overview of the features of human decision making that have informed behavioral law 
and economics, emphasizing points of departure from work in other areas of behavioral 
economics.  Section 4 describes a series of illustrative applications of behavioral law and 
economics analysis.  Section 5 introduces the concept of debiasing through law, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  The Endowment Effect in Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Law and 
Economics 
 
Early on, law and economics had a central point of contact with behavioral economics.  
The point of contact was the foundational debate over the Coase theorem and the “endowment 
effect” – the tendency of people to refuse to give up entitlements they hold even though they 
would not have bought those entitlements initially (Thaler 1980:43-47).  This early point of 
contact between law and economics and behavioral economics helped to lay the ground for a rich 
literature down the road on the endowment effect in both behavioral economics and behavioral 
law and economics. 
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2.1  The Coase Theorem 
An unquestioned centerpiece of law and economics is the Coase theorem (Coase 1960).  
This theorem posits that allocating legal rights to one party or another will not affect outcomes if 
transaction costs are sufficiently low; thus, for instance, whether the law gives a factory the right 
to emit pollution next to a laundry or, instead, says the laundry has a right to be free of pollution 
will not matter to the ultimate outcome (pollution or no pollution) as long as transaction costs are 
sufficiently low.  The reason for this result is that, with low transaction costs, the parties should 
be expected bargain to the efficient outcome under either legal regime.  The Coase theorem is 
central to law and economics because of (among other things) the theorem’s claim about the 
domain within which normative analysis of legal rules – whether rule A is preferable to rule B or 
the reverse – is actually relevant.   
The Coase theorem has also played a central, albeit a rather different, role in the field of 
behavioral economics.  More than fifteen years ago, Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and 
Richard Thaler (1990) reported the results of a set of experiments designed to provide a careful 
empirical assessment of the Coase theorem.  In one round of experiments, each subject was 
given an assigned value for a “token” (the amount for which the subject could redeem the token 
for cash at the end of the experiment), and half of the subjects were awarded tokens.  When 
subjects subsequently had the opportunity to trade tokens for money or (for those not awarded 
tokens) money for tokens, subjects behaved precisely in accordance with the Coase theorem.  
Exactly half of the tokens changed hands, as theory would predict (given random assignment of 
the tokens in relation to the specified values).  The initial allocation of tokens proved irrelevant.  
These findings are a striking vindication of the Coase theorem.  
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Having thus established that transaction costs in the experimental setting were 
sufficiently low to vindicate the Coase theorem, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler went on to study 
subjects’ behavior when the good to be traded was not tokens but, rather, Cornell University 
mugs that the subjects would retain after the experiment (rather than redeeming for an assigned 
amount of cash).  In direct contravention of the Coase theorem, the initial assignment of 
entitlements to the mug mattered dramatically; those initially given mugs rarely sold them, while 
those not initially given mugs seldom bought them.  Following Thaler (1980:44), Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler referred to this effect as the “endowment effect” – the refusal to give up an 
entitlement one holds initially even though one would not have been willing to pay to acquire 
that entitlement had one not held it initially.
2  In the presence of the endowment effect, the Coase 
theorem’s prediction of equivalent outcomes regardless of the initial entitlement no longer holds. 
This conclusion has obvious importance for the design of legal rules.  
 
2.2  The Endowment Effect Within Law and Economics 
A central task of law and economics is to assess the desirability of actual and proposed 
legal rules.  The endowment effect both preserves a larger scope for such normative economic 
analysis – because the Coase theorem and the associated claim of irrelevance of legal rules no 
longer hold – and profoundly unsettles the bases for such analysis.   
The reason that the endowment effect so unsettles the bases for normative economic 
analysis of law is that in the presence of this effect the value attached to a legal entitlement will 
sometimes vary depending on the initial assignment of the entitlement.  Normative analysis will 
 
2 A recent article by Plott and Zeiler (2005) addresses the effect of experimental design on the existence 
and degree of the endowment effect.  
6 
                                                     
then often become indeterminant, as multiple rules may maximize the desired objective (whether 
wealth or social welfare) depending on the starting allocation of entitlements (Kelman 1979:676-
78).  As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003:1190) recently observed, in the presence of the 
endowment effect a “cost-benefit study cannot be based on willingness to pay (WTP), because 
WTP will be a function of the default rule.”  Thus, the cost-benefit study “must be a more open-
ended (and inevitably somewhat subjective) assessment of the welfare consequences.”
3  The 
conventional normative economic analysis feasible without the endowment effect often cannot 
survive in the presence of this effect. 
One possible approach to normative analysis when the value of an entitlement varies 
depending on the initial assignment of the entitlement is to base legal policy choices not on the 
joint wealth or welfare of the parties directly in question – because the answer to the question of 
which rule maximizes their joint wealth or welfare may turn on the initial rule choice – but rather 
on the third-party effects of the competing rules.  Thus, for instance, if it is unclear whether a 
particular workplace rule is or is not optimal for employers and employees (because employees 
will value the entitlement granted by the rule at more than its value with the rule in place but less 
than its value otherwise), but the rule will create important benefits for employees’ families, then 
perhaps the rule should be adopted.     
An alternative approach to normative analysis with varying entitlement values depending 
on the initial assignment of the entitlement is to make a judgment about which preferences – the 
ones with legal rule A or the ones with legal rule B – deserve greater deference.  Sunstein and 
 
3 Sunstein and Thaler’s discussion is addressed to both the endowment effect and other factors that 
produce an effect of the law’s structure on people’s background preferences.  The focus of the discussion 
here is the endowment effect.  
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Thaler (2003:1190-91) offer some support for this view in the context of default terms in 
employee savings plans.  Referring to research showing that employees are much more likely to 
enroll in a savings plan if enrollment is the default term and employees must affirmatively opt 
out to be excluded than if non-enrollment is the default term and employees must take 
affirmative steps to enroll, Sunstein and Thaler make the normative argument that the enrollment 
outcome is “highly likely” to be better under automatic enrollment than under a default term of 
non-enrollment because it turns out that very few employees drop out if automatically enrolled.  
They readily acknowledge that “[s]ome readers might think that our reliance on [employees’] 
behavior as an indication of welfare is inconsistent” with the basic point about indeterminacy of 
preferences, “[b]ut in fact, there is no inconsistency” because “it is reasonable to think that if, on 
reflection, workers realized that they had been ‘tricked’ into saving too much, they might take 
the effort to opt out.”  Sunstein and Thaler draw an analogy to rules calling for mandatory 
cooling-off periods before consumer purchases:  “The premise of such rules is that people are 
more likely to make good choices when they have had time to think carefully and without a 
salesperson present.”  In other words, according to Sunstein and Thaler, we have reason to think 
that the revealed preferences of the automatically enrolled employee, or the consumer at the end 
of a cooling-off period, are a more appropriate basis for normative judgment than the revealed 
preferences of the employee who does not choose to enroll under a default term of non-
enrollment, or the consumer before the cooling-off period.  We will see similar issues, along with 
some prospect for avoiding the “inevitably subjective” determinations confronted by Sunstein 
and Thaler, in the discussion of bounded willpower in section 3.2 below. 
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2.3  The Importance of Context 
Particularly in light of the central relevance of the endowment effect to normative 
economic analysis of law, it is appropriate to emphasize the important role of context in whether 
this effect occurs.  An early literature in law and economics is responsible for helping to shape 
understandings of when the endowment effect will and will not occur.   
Prior to the Cornell University “mugs experiments” described above, a series of law and 
economics articles had demonstrated a set of domains in which the Coase theorem was in fact 
empirically robust.  Hoffman and Spitzer’s (1982, 1986) experiments showed that in both large 
and small groups the predictions of the theorem were vindicated.  Likewise, Schwab (1988) 
found that ultimate allocation of entitlements did not turn on their initial allocation.   
All of these experiments, however, shared with the tokens experiment discussed above 
the feature that subjects’ value of each possible outcome was directly specified in dollar terms by 
the experimenter.  Thus, the law and economics work from the 1980s showed that if people are 
told specifically what each outcome is worth to them, they will generally find their way to a 
value-maximizing outcome, so long as transaction costs are sufficiently low.  However, the later 
“mugs experiments” demonstrated that this result tends to collapse when actors are not instructed 
as to the value of outcomes to them.  Viewed in light of the later work, the law and economics 
papers from the 1980s are best understood as showing some of the important limits on when the 
endowment effect will be observed and, more generally, the central role of context in influencing 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of this effect.  The work by Plott and Zeiler (2005) provides an 
important recent lens on the role of context in determining the existence and degree of the 
endowment effect.  
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Within behavioral law and economics, recent work has refined the basic point about the 
importance of context.  Korobkin (1998), for instance, raised the important question of whether 
the endowment effect would obtain in the allocation to either prospective sellers or prospective 
buyers of contract law default rights, such as the right of sellers to withhold goods or services 
after unanticipated natural disasters or other similar events versus the right of buyers to demand 
goods or services in those circumstances.  (For instance, if a theatre owner has promised to allow 
its theatre to be used by another party on a specific date, but the theatre then burns down before 
that date, does the theatre owner have the right not to provide the theatre, or does the other party 
have the right to collect damages for the harm it suffered because the theatre proved 
unavailable?)  Such contact law entitlements do not attach – and indeed are irrelevant – until and 
unless a contract is ultimately agreed to, and thus Korobkin noted that it was unclear whether the 
initial allocation of the entitlements through contract law default rules would create the sort of 
sense of ownership or possession that in turn would generate an endowment effect.   
Korobkin’s experiments support the operation of the endowment effect in this context.  
He finds that if contract law allocates an entitlement to party A unless party A agrees to waive it, 
then a contract between that party and party B is more likely to award party A that entitlement 
than if contract law initially allocates the entitlement to party B – even with seemingly low 
transaction costs.  Thus, Korobkin concludes, the endowment effect, and not the Coase theorem, 
provides the best account of the effects of contract law default rights.  The deepening of 
knowledge about when the endowment effect does and does not occur – across contract settings 
and elsewhere – will help refine our understanding of the scope of this effect and, as a direct 
consequence, the validity of and limits on conventional normative economic analysis of law. 
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3.  The Modern Domain of Behavioral Law and Economics 
Although the endowment effect has played a central role in behavioral law and 
economics, other features of behavioral economics are important as well.  Following Thaler 
(1996), it is useful for purposes of behavioral law and economics analysis to view human actors 
as departing from traditional economic assumptions in three distinct ways:  human actors exhibit 
bounded rationality,  bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.  All three concepts are 
defined in the brief discussion below.  As described below, bounded rationality consists in part 
of judgment errors, and along with the usual types of such errors discussed in the existing 
literature in behavioral economics, behavioral law and economics has recently emphasized a 
separate form of judgment error – implicit bias in how members of racial and other groups are 
perceived by individuals who consciously disavow any sort of prejudiced attitude; this form of 
judgment error provides the starting part for the discussion below. 
 
3.1 Bounded  Rationality 
Departures from traditional economic assumptions of unbounded rationality may be 
divided into two main categories, judgment errors and departures from expected utility theory. 
 
3.1.1   Judgment Errors 
Across a wide range of contexts, actual judgments show systematic differences from 
unbiased forecasts.  Within this category of judgment errors, behavioral law and economics has 
recently emphasized errors in the form of implicit bias in people’s perceptions of racial and other 
group members.    
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Implicit Racial and Other Group-Based Bias.  Perhaps the most elementary definition 
of the word “bias” is that a person believes, either consciously or implicitly, that members of 
a racial or other group are somehow less worthy than other individuals.  An enormous 
literature in modern social psychology explores the cognitive, motivational, and other aspects 
of implicit, or unconscious, forms of racial or other group-based bias.  This literature, 
however, has not featured significantly in most fields of behavioral economics.  But a clear 
contrast is behavioral law and economics, which has recently given significant emphasis to 
the possibility and effects of implicit racial or other group-based bias. 
The behavioral law and economics literature in this area has worked against the backdrop 
of a heavily Beckerian approach to discrimination.  Seminal law and economics works on 
discrimination envision such behavior as in significant part a rational response to discriminatory 
“tastes” that disfavor association with particular group members (e.g., R. Posner 1989).  The idea 
of implicit bias, by contrast, suggests that discriminatory behavior often stems not from taste-
based preferences that individuals are consciously acting to satisfy, but instead from implicit 
attitudes afflicting individuals who seriously and sincerely disclaim all forms of prejudice, and 
who would regard their implicitly biased judgments as “errors.”  A number of recent works in 
behavioral law and economics have begun to explore the implications for the analysis of 
discrimination law of various types of implicit bias (e.g., Gulati and Yelnowsky 2006; Jolls and 
Sunstein 2006). 
While social psychologists have identified diverse means of assessing and measuring 
implicit bias against members of racial and other groups (e.g., Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983; 
Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998), a particular measure, known as the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), has had particular influence.  In the IAT, individuals are asked to  
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categorize words or pictures into four groups, two of which are racial or other groups (such as 
“black” and “white”), and the other two of which are the categories “pleasant” and “unpleasant.”  
Groups are paired, so that respondents are instructed to press one key on the computer for either 
“black” or “unpleasant” and a different key for either “white” or “pleasant” (a stereotype-
consistent pairing); or are instructed instead to press one key on the computer for either “black” 
or “pleasant” and a different key for either “white” or “unpleasant” (a stereotype-inconsistent 
pairing).  Implicit bias is defined as faster categorization when the “black” and “unpleasant” 
categories are paired than when the “black” and “pleasant” categories are paired.  The IAT 
reveals significant evidence of implicit bias, including among those who assiduously deny any 
prejudice (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002).   
An important question raised by the results on the IAT is whether implicit bias as 
measured by the test is correlated with individuals’ actual behavior toward members of other 
groups.  Studies including McConnell and Leibold (2001) and Dovidio, Kawakami and Gaertner 
(2002) find that scores on the IAT and similar tests show correlations with third parties’ ratings 
of the degree of general friendliness shown by individuals toward members of other groups.  
Other connections between IAT scores and actual behavior are an active area of research. 
Although implicit racial or other group-based bias is not conventionally grouped with 
other forms of bounded rationality within behavioral economics, the fit may be more natural than 
has typically been supposed.  Such implicit bias may often result from the way in which the 
characteristic of race or other group membership operates as a sort of “heuristic” – a form of 
mental short-cut.  (The concept of a heuristic is discussed more fully just below.)  Indeed, recent 
psychology research emphasizes that heuristics often work through a process of “attribute 
substitution,” in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one (Kahneman  
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and Frederick 2002).  For instance, people might resolve a question of probability not by 
investigating statistics, but by asking whether a relevant incident comes easily to mind (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973).  The same process can operate to produce implicit bias against racial or 
other groups. Section 5.1 below describes an example of how implicit bias has been analyzed 
within behavioral law and economics. 
The “Heuristics and Biases” Literature.  Judgment errors may arise not only from 
implicit bias against racial or other group members, but also from other biases studied within 
the so-called “heuristics and biases” literature within behavioral economics.  Three types of 
judgment errors from this literature have received particularly sustained attention within 
behavioral law and economics.   
One such judgment error is optimism bias, in which individuals believe that their own 
probability of facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is.  As a familiar illustration, most 
people think that their chances of having an auto accident are significantly lower than the 
average person’s chances of experiencing this event (e.g., DeJoy 1989), although of course these 
beliefs cannot all be correct; if everyone were below “average,” then the average would be 
lower.
4  There is also evidence that people underestimate their absolute as well as relative (to 
 
4 As described in Jolls (1998), an interesting subtlety here is that if the question is whether one’s 
probability of experiencing a bad event is below the average probability of experiencing that event (as 
distinguished from the average person’s probability of experiencing that event), then it is possible for 
most people to be below average. To illustrate, suppose that for 80% of the population the probability of 
being involved in an auto accident is 10%, and for 20% it is 60%. Then the average probability of being 
involved in an auto accident is 20% (.1 x .8  .6 x .2 = .2). So for 80% of the population, the probability of 
being involved in an auto accident (10%) is below the average probability (20%). But the average person 
has a 10% chance of being involved in an auto accident, and it would be impossible for more than half of 
the population to have a probability below this. The natural interpretation of most studies of optimism 
bias would seem to be that they request a comparison with the average person’s probability, rather than 
with the average probability; the average probability would often be quite difficult to compute and not 
within the grasp of most subjects. Moreover, at least one study has dealt explicitly with the issue raised  
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other individuals) probability of negative events such as auto accidents (Arnould and Grabowski 
1981:34-35; Camerer and Kunreuther 1989:566).  Optimism bias is probably highly adaptive as a 
general matter; by thinking that things will turn out well, people may often increase the chance 
that they will turn out well.  Section 4.1 below describes an application of optimism bias in the 
behavioral law and economics literature. 
A second judgment error prominent in behavioral law and economics is self-serving bias.  
Whenever there is room for disagreement about a matter to be decided by two or more parties – 
and of course there often is in litigation as well as elsewhere – individuals will tend to interpret 
information in a direction that serves their own interests.  In a compelling field study, Babcock, 
Wang and Loewenstein (1996) find that union and school board presidents asked to identify 
“comparable” school districts for purposes of labor negotiations identified different lists of 
districts depending on their respective self-interests.  While the average teacher salary in districts 
viewed as comparable by union presidents was $27,633, the same average was $26,922 in 
districts viewed as comparable by school board presidents.  As Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein 
observe, this difference was more than large enough to produce teacher strikes based on the size 
of past salary disagreements leading to strikes.  Section 4.2 below discusses an application of 
self-serving bias in the behavioral law and economics literature. 
A third judgment error extensively discussed in behavioral law and economics is the 
hindsight bias, in which decision makers attach excessively high probabilities to events simply 
because they ended up occurring.  In one striking study, neuropsychologists were presented with 
a list of patient symptoms and then asked to assess the probability that the patient had each of 
 
here and has found significant evidence of optimism bias even using the average probability benchmark 
(Weinstein 1980:809-12).  
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three conditions (alcohol withdrawal, Alzheimer’s disease, and brain damage secondary to 
alcohol abuse).  While the mean probabilities for physicians who were not informed of the 
patient’s actual condition were 37%, 26% and 37% respectively for the three conditions, 
physicians who were informed of the patient’s actual condition routinely said they would have 
attached much higher probabilities to that condition (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette and Hart 1988).  
Even when, as in the study, people are specifically instructed to give the probabilities they would 
have assigned had they been the one making the diagnosis, people seem to have difficulty putting 
aside events they know to have occurred.  As highlighted in section 4.3 below, the hindsight bias 
has clear relevance to the legal system because that system is pervasively in the business of 
adjudicating likelihoods and foreseeability after an accident or other event has occurred.   
 
3.1.2  Departures from Expected Utility Theory 
Boundedly rational individuals not only make judgment errors but also deviate from the 
precepts of expected utility theory.  While this theory is a foundational aspect of traditional 
economic analysis, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) “prospect theory” offers a leading 
alternative to expected utility theory.  Within behavioral law and economics, the feature of 
prospect theory that emphasizes the distinction between gains and losses relative to an 
endowment point has received by far the most attention; the relevant work on the endowment 
effect was discussed in some detail in section 2 above. 
 
3.2 Bounded  Willpower 
We often observe individuals choosing to spend rather than save, consume desserts over 
salads, and go to the movies instead of the gym despite all of their best intentions (Schelling  
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1984; Laibson 1997).  Why do people fail to follow through on the plans they make?  Behavioral 
economics has emphasized the concept of bounded willpower, which has a long pedigree in 
economics (Strotz 1955-56).  This concept has featured in behavioral law and economics as well, 
as illustrated in section 4.4 below. 
Much work in law and economics is normatively-oriented, and this feature of the work 
brings to the fore a set of normative questions about bounded willpower – much in the way that 
normative questions have been prominent in law and economics discussions of the endowment 
effect (pp. 5-7 above).  With respect to bounded willpower, the central normative question 
concerns how to view a decision to spend rather than save, to consume desserts rather than 
salads, or to go to the gym rather than the movies.  Why should (if they should) the preferences 
of the self who wishes to save, eat salad, or go to the gym rather than the self who wishes to 
spend, eat dessert, or watch movies be used as the benchmark in performing normative analysis?   
One possible answer, partially reminiscent of a strand of the endowment effect discussion 
above, is that saving, eating salad, or going to the gym creates desirable third-party effects that 
are absent with spending, eating dessert, or watching movies.  Another possible answer, also 
with an analogue in the earlier discussion, is that the preferences of the self who wishes to save, 
eat salad, or go to the gym reflect a considered judgment about the matter in question – the 
rightness of which, however, it is not possible always to keep before one’s mind (Elster 
1979:52).  Of course, each of these two types of judgments about the relative merits of different 
preferences may be contentions in at least some settings. 
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3.3 Bounded  Self-Interest 
In principle, traditional economic analysis is capacious with respect to the range of 
admissible preferences.  Preferences that give significant weight to fairness, for instance, can be 
included in the analysis (Kaplow and Shavell 2002:431-34).  In practice, however, much of 
traditional law and economics posits a relatively narrow set of ends that individuals are imagined 
to pursue.   
Contrary to this conventional approach, bounded self-interest within behavioral 
economics emphasizes that many people care about both giving and receiving fair treatment in a 
range of settings (Rabin 1993).  As Thaler and Dawes (1992:19-20) observe: 
In the rural areas around Ithaca it is common for farmers to put some fresh 
produce on a table by the road.  There is a cash box on the table, and customers 
are expected to put money in the box in return for the vegetables they take.  The 
box has just a small slit, so money can only be put in, not taken out.  Also, the 
box is attached to the table, so no one can (easily) make off with the money.  We 
think that the farmers who use this system have just about the right model of 
human nature.  They feel that enough people will volunteer to pay for the fresh 
corn to make it worthwhile to put it out there. 
   
Of course, a central question raised by bounded self-interest is what counts as “fair” 
treatment.  Behavioral economics suggests that people will judge outcomes as unfair if they 
depart substantially from the terms of a “reference transaction” – a transaction that defines the 
benchmark for the parties’ interactions (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a).  In the basic 
version of the well-known ultimatum game, for instance, where parties divide a sum of money 
with no reason to think one party is particularly more deserving than the other, the “reference 
transaction” is something like an equal split; substantial departures from this benchmark are 
viewed as unfair and, accordingly, are punished by parties who receive offers of such treatment 
(Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986b).  Section 4.5  
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below illustrates how this conception of bounded self-interest has been applied within behavioral 
law and economics. 
 
4. Illustrative  Applications  of Behavioral Law and Economics 
The present section offers a set of illustrative applications of behavioral law and 
economics.  The discussion seeks to illustrate what has become essentially “normal science” 
within the literature in behavioral law and economics to date:  identification of a departure from 
unbounded rationality, willpower or self-interest, followed by either an account of existing law 
or a proposed legal reform that takes as a fixed point the identified departure from unbounded 
rationality, willpower or self-interest.  Section 5 shifts the focus to a new approach within 
behavioral law and economics, one that emphasizes the potential for responding to some bounds 
on human behavior not by taking people’s natural tendencies as given and shaping law around 
them but, instead, by attempting to reduce or eliminate such human tendencies through the legal 
structure – the approach of “debiasing through law” (Jolls and Sunstein 2006a). 
Recent surveys on behavioral law and economics by Guthrie (2003), Korobkin (2003), 
and Rachlinski (2003) have examined existing legally-oriented work on bounded rationality, 
devoting extensive attention to both judgment errors and departures from expected utility 
theory.
5  The present section, by contrast, focuses on a limited number of applications of 
 
5 While work on bounded willpower and bounded self-interest within behavioral law and economics has 
not recently been surveyed, examples of behavioral law and economics work on bounded willpower 
include Weiss (1991), Jolls (1997), and Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(2003), while examples of behavioral law and economics work on bounded self-interest include 
Greenfield (2002), Jolls (2002), and Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2004).  
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bounded rationality, willpower and self-interest, attempting to give a fuller picture of some of the 
relevant work in these areas. 
 
4.1  “Distributive Legal Rules”
6
As noted in the introduction, one distinctive feature of law and economics is its frequent 
focus on wealth maximization – giving legal entitlements to those most willing to pay for them, 
without regard for distributional considerations – rather than social welfare maximization as the 
criterion for normative analysis.  Many law and economics scholars object to “distributive legal 
rules” – non-wealth-maximizing legal rules chosen for their distributive consequences – because 
they believe that distributional issues are best left solely to the tax system (Kaplow and Shavell 
1994). 
A leading law and economics argument in favor of addressing distributional issues 
through the tax system rather than through non-tax legal rules is the argument that any desired 
distributional consequence can be achieved at lower cost through the tax system than through 
distributive legal rules.  Of course, pursuit of distributional objectives through the tax system is 
not costless; higher taxes on the wealthy will tend to distort work incentives.  But under 
traditional economic assumptions precisely the same is true of distributive legal rules:  “[U]sing 
legal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax system 
– because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself . . . .” (Kaplow and Shavell 
1994:667-68).  Thus, for example, under traditional economic analysis a thirty percent marginal 
tax rate, together with a non-wealth-maximizing legal rule that transfers an average of one 
 
6 This subsection is an abridged version of Jolls (1998).  
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percent of high earners’ income to the poor, creates the same distortion in work incentives as a 
thirty-one percent marginal tax rate coupled with a wealth-maximizing legal rule.  However, the 
former regime also entails costs due to the non-wealth-maximizing legal rule.  (For instance, 
under a distributive legal rule governing accidents, potential defendants may be excessively 
cautious and thus may be discouraged from engaging in socially valuable activities.)  Thus, 
whatever the desired distributive consequences, under traditional economic analysis they can 
always be achieved at lower cost by choosing the wealth-maximizing legal rule and adjusting 
distributive effects through the tax system than by choosing a non-wealth-maximizing rule 
because of its distributive properties (Shavell 1981). 
A basic premise about human behavior underlies this analysis.  Work incentives are 
assumed to be distorted by the same amount as a result of a probabilistic, non-tax mode of 
redistribution, such as the law governing accidents, as they are as a result of a tax.  Thus, for 
example, if high-income individuals face a .02 probability of incurring tort liability for an 
accident, then a distributive legal rule that imposes $500,000 extra in damages (beyond what a 
wealth-maximizing rule would call for) would distort work incentives by the same amount as a 
tax of $10,000, assuming risk-neutrality.
7   
Why would distributive tort liability and taxes have the same effects on work incentives? 
“[W]hen an individual . . . contemplates earning additional income by working harder, his total 
marginal expected payments [out of that income] equal the sum of his marginal tax payment and 
the expected marginal cost on account of accidents.”  (Kaplow and Shavell 1994:671.)  The 
 
7 Of course, risk-averse actors may choose to purchase insurance against tort liability; see Jolls (1998) for 
a discussion of the role of insurance in this analysis.    
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expected costs of the two forms of redistribution are the same, and thus behavior is affected in 
the same way.  At least that is the assumption that traditional economic analysis makes. 
Is this assumption valid? From a behavioral economics perspective, it is not clear that an 
individual would typically experience the same disincentive to work as a result of a more 
generous (to victims) tort-law regime as would be experienced as a result of a higher level of 
taxation.
8  The discussion here will highlight one important reason, related to the phenomenon of 
optimism bias noted in section 3 above, that behavioral law and economics suggests work 
incentives may be distorted less by distributive tort liability – which operates probabilistically 
rather than deterministically – than by taxes.  Other reasons for different effects of the two 
regimes, based on different contextual factors across the regimes, are discussed in Jolls (1998). 
As just noted, a salient feature of distributive tort liability is the uncertainty of its 
application to any given actor.  The effect of such liability “tends to be limited to those few who 
become parties to lawsuits” (Kaplow and Shavell 1994:675.)  While one knows that one will 
have to pay taxes every year, one knows that one is quite likely not to become involved in an 
accident.  To be sure, the possibility of uncertain or randomized taxation has received some 
discussion in the public finance literature.  Even supporters of this approach, however, suggest 
that it is unrealistic from a practical perspective (Stiglitz 1987:1012-13). 
Bounded rationality in the form of optimism bias – the tendency to think negative events 
are less likely to happen to oneself than they actually are – suggests that uncertain events are 
often processed systematically differently from certain events.  Section 3.1.1 above referred to 
the general body of evidence suggesting the prevalence of optimism bias; there are also empirical 
 
8 However, as emphasized in Jolls (1998), only empirical evidence that we do not yet have can 
definitively resolve the question.    
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studies suggesting that people offer unrealistically optimistic assessments in areas directly 
related to the effects of distributive tort liability.  For instance, most people think that they are 
less likely than the average person to be sued (Weinstein 1980:810).  Likewise, people think that 
they are less likely than the average person to cause an auto accident (Svenson, Fischhoff and 
MacGregor 1985; DeJoy 1989).  They also think that their own probability of being caught and 
penalized for drunk driving is lower than the average driver’s probability of being apprehended 
for such behavior (Guppy 1993). 
What does optimism bias with respect to the probability of the negative event of tort 
liability imply for the distortionary effects of distributive tort liability as opposed to taxes?   
People will tend to underestimate the probability that they will be hit with liability under 
distributive tort liability; therefore, their perceived cost of the rule will be lower.  As a result, 
their work incentives will tend to suffer a lesser degree of distortion than under a tax yielding the 
same amount of revenue for the government.  For instance, in the numerical example from 
above, risk-neutral individuals may not attach an expected cost of $10,000 to a .02 (objective) 
probability of having to pay $500,000 extra in damages under distributive tort liability; they may 
tend to underestimate the probability that they will incur liability – and thus they may tend to 
underestimate the expected cost of liability – as a result of optimism bias.
9
 
9 Note that underestimation of the probability of liability would affect not only the distortion of work 
incentives from a distributive (and thus, by the definition given above, non-wealth-maximizing) legal 
rule, but also the determination of what the wealth-maximizing legal rule would be. If potential 
tortfeasors underestimate the probability of liability, then optimal deterrence would require greater 
generosity to tort victims than the wealth-maximizing legal rule without underestimation of probabilities 
would involve. But the newly-generous rule would not be "distributive" in the relevant sense, since it 
would not be sacrificing wealth-maximization to achieve distributive goals. The focus of the present 
discussion, as stated above, is on legal rules that pursue distributive consequences at the expense of 
wealth-maximization.  
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Of course, optimism bias is not the only phenomenon that affects how people assess the 
likelihood of uncertain events.  In some cases people may tend to overestimate rather than 
underestimate the probability of a negative event because the risk in question is highly salient or 
otherwise available to them – for instance, contamination from a hazardous waste dump (Kuran 
and Sunstein 1999:691-97).  However, the overestimation phenomenon seems relatively unlikely 
to affect the assessment of distributive tort liability, at least insofar as individuals rather than 
firms are concerned.  Consider, for instance, the quintessential event that can expose an 
individual to tort liability: the auto accident.  As noted above, people appear to underestimate the 
probability that they will be involved in an auto accident (relative to the actual probability); this 
presumably results from a combination of underestimation of the general probability of an 
accident (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs 1978:564) and further 
underestimation of people’s own probability relative to the average person’s (Svenson, Fischhoff 
and MacGregor 1985; DeJoy 1989).  The situation would probably be different, of course, for an 
event such as contamination from a hazardous waste dump, the probability of which might be 
overestimated due to its availability; but highly available events tend to involve firm, not 
individual, liability.  It is difficult to come up with examples of events giving rise to individual 
liability the probability of which is likely to be overestimated rather than (as suggested above) 
underestimated.  And with underestimation of the probability of liability, work incentives will 
typically be distorted less by distributive legal rules than by taxes. 
 
4.2  Discovery Rules in Litigation 
The introduction noted that an important aspect of work in law and economics is analysis 
of various areas of law that were not previously studied by economists.  One such area concerns  
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the rules governing the litigation process.  When someone believes that a law has been violated, 
how does the legal system go about deciding the legitimacy of that claim?  The American system 
relies centrally upon an adversary approach, under which competing sides are represented by 
legal counsel who argue in favor of their respective positions.   
Of course, maximally effective advocacy for a position often requires one to obtain 
information under the control of one’s opponent, and thus the American legal system contains a 
set of rules governing when and how one side in a legal dispute may obtain (“discover”) 
information from the other side.  Since 1993 these rules have required opposing parties to 
disclose significant information even without a request by the other party (Issacharoff and 
Loewenstein 1995).  Under conventional economic analysis this approach should increase the 
convergence of parties’ expectations and, thus, the rate at which they settle disputes out of court 
(e.g., Shavell 2004:427). 
The phenomenon of self-serving bias described in section 3.1.1 above, however, suggests 
that individuals often interpret information differently depending on the direction of their own 
self-interest.  Experimental work by Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer and Babcock (1993), 
Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer (1995), and Loewenstein and Moore (2004) has 
examined self-serving bias in the specific context of litigation.  In the first paper in the series, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer and Babcock found that parties assigned to the role of 
plaintiff or defendant interpreted the very same facts differently depending on their assigned 
role; subjects assigned to the plaintiff role offered higher estimates of the likely outcome at trial 
than subjects assigned to the defendant role even though they both received identical information 
about the case.  Moreover, the authors found that subjects who exhibited the highest levels of 
self-serving bias were also least likely to succeed in negotiating out-of-court settlements.  This  
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work provided opening evidence of the role of self-serving bias in shaping the effect of 
information disclosure on the rate at which legal disputes are settled. 
The initial study just described could not rule out the possibility that the relationship 
between the degree of self-serving bias and the frequency of settlement was non-causal, for it is 
possible that an unmeasured factor influenced both the degree of self-serving bias and the 
frequency of settlement.  In a follow-up study, however, Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and 
Camerer (1995) provided strong evidence that the relationship was in fact causal.  They found 
that parties who were not informed of their roles until after reading case materials and offering 
their estimates of the likely outcome at trial both failed to exhibit statistically significant degrees 
of self-serving bias and settled at significantly greater rates than parties who were informed of 
their roles before reading the case materials.  The timing of exposure to the case materials 
matters because “[s]elf-serving interpretations are likely to occur at the point when information 
about roles is assimilated,” for the simple reason that it “is easier to process information in a 
biased way than it is to change an unbiased estimate once it has been made” (Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer 1995:1339).  The recent study by Loewenstein and Moore 
(2004) underlines the fact that self-serving bias will operate when there is some degree of 
ambiguity about the proper or best interpretation of a set of information, as will frequently be the 
case in litigation. 
The prospect that litigants will interpret at least some information in a self-serving 
fashion means that the exchange of information in litigation may cause a divergence rather than 
convergence of parties’ expectations.  Relying in part on this argument, Issacharoff and 
Loewenstein (1995) suggest that mandatory disclosure rules in litigation may be undesirable. As 
they describe, self-serving bias undermines the conventional wisdom that “a full exchange of the  
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information in the possession of the parties is likely to facilitate settlement by enabling each 
party to form a more accurate, and generally therefore a more convergent, estimate of the likely 
outcome of the case” (R. Posner 1992:557, quoted in Issacharoff and Loewenstein 1995:773).  
Consistent with Issacharoff and Loewenstein’s argument, a set of amendments in 2000 
significantly cut back – although they did not completely eliminate – the mandatory disclosure 
rules noted above (192 Federal Rules Decisions 340, 385-87). 
 
4.3  The “Business Judgment” Rule in Corporate Law 
The third distinctive feature of law and economics discussed in the introduction 
concerned the field’s interest in explaining and predicting the content of law – what the law 
allows and what it prohibits. First-generation law and economics scholars emphasized the idea 
that laws may be efficient solutions to the problems of organizing society; law and economics 
has also emphasized – as has the field of political economy – that laws may come about because 
of the rent-seeking activities of politically powerful actors (Stigler 1971). 
Behavioral law and economics has extended this conventional account of the content of 
legal rules in two important ways.  The first, which is the focus of the discussion in this section, 
is that in many cases incorporation of insights about bounded rationality, willpower and self-
interest is needed for a satisfactory understanding of law’s efficiency properties.  A law may be 
efficient in part because of the way in which it accounts for one of the three bounds on human 
behavior, as the discussion below illustrates.  The second extension of the conventional law and 
economics account of the content of law is the expansion of behavioral law and economics 
beyond the two familiar categories from the traditional account – the category of law-as-
efficiency-enhancing and the category of law-as-the product-of-conventional-rent-seeking.   
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Section 4.5 below discusses and illustrates this second extension developed by behavioral law 
and economics. 
A prominent behavioral law and economics work seeking to understand and explain the 
efficiency of the content of law is Rachlinski (1998).  Rachlinski examines a number of areas of 
law, including corporate law.  A central rule of American corporate law is the “business 
judgment” rule, according to which corporate officers and directors who are informed about a 
corporation’s activities and who approve or acquiesce in these activities have generally fulfilled 
their duties to the corporation as long as they have a rational belief that such activities are in the 
interests of the corporation.  This highly deferential standard of liability makes it difficult to find 
legal fault for the decisions of corporate officers and directors. 
Rachlinski suggests that the business judgment rule may be corporate law’s sensible 
response to the problem of hindsight bias.  As described above, hindsight bias suggests that the 
sorts of decisions routinely made by the legal system, adjudicating likelihoods and foreseeability 
after a negative event has materialized, will often be biased toward excessively high estimates – 
and thus in favor of holding actors responsible – simply because the negative event materialized.  
But under the business judgment rule, officers and directors will not be held liable for decisions 
that turn out badly – “even if these decisions seem negligent in hindsight” (Rachlinski 
1998:620).  Hindsight bias suggests that things will often seem negligent in hindsight, once a 
negative outcome has materialized and is known, so the business judgment rule insulates officers 
and directors from the risk of such hindsight-influenced liability determinations.  In the absence 
of the business judgment rule, Rachlinski argues, officers and directors would fail to make the 
risk-neutral business decisions desired by investors who can limit their overall investment risk 
through diversification; “[e]nsuring that managers effectively represent this concern and do not  
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avoid business decisions that have a high expected payoff but also carry a high degree of risk is a 
central problem of corporate governance” (Rachlinski 1998:622).  In this respect, hindsight bias 
can help to explain the efficiency of the content of law governing corporate officers and 
directors. 
 
4.4  Rules Governing Contract Renegotiation
10
The behavioral law and economics applications discussed thus far have involved bounded 
rationality, but other applications have drawn on the other two bounds on human behavior.  This 
subsection describes an application of the concept of bounded willpower within behavioral law 
and economics.   
As discussed above, an individual with bounded willpower will often have difficulty 
sticking to even the best-laid plans.  With respect to decisions about consumption versus saving, 
for instance, individuals who earnestly plan to save a substantial amount of next year’s salary for 
retirement may tend, once next year arrives, to save far less than planned.  If the failure to stick 
to the initial plan is understood in advance, then individuals may seek to precommit themselves 
to their initial plan.  An obvious potential means of achieving such precommitment is a contract 
between the individual suffering from bounded willpower and a bank or other savings institution; 
but the efficacy of this approach from the standpoint of the individual at the time of 
contemplating such a contract depends critically on whether contracts are, or can be made, 
nonrenegotiable.    Down the road it will always be in the parties’ mutual interest to renegotiate 
the initial contract, for at later points the individual will be better off if the individual can 
 
10 This subsection is an abridged version of Jolls (1997).  
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consume more and save less than what the original contract called for, and thus at that point there 
is a surplus from renegotiation to be divided between the parties.  Only if renegotiation is 
impossible can the parties avoid the effects of bounded willpower and achieve commitment to 
the initial plan. 
The obvious question is then whether contract law allows nonrenegotiable contracts.   
Certainly the default rule of contract law is that renegotiated agreements are enforceable.  The 
primary exception to enforcement of such agreements concerns renegotiated agreements coerced 
by one party’s threat to breach the original contract if renegotiation does not occur.
11  But in the 
model discussed here, renegotiation is truly welfare-enhancing – at the time at which it occurs – 
for both parties relative to the original contract, so the coercion concern does not apply, and thus 
the default rule would allow enforcement of the renegotiated agreement. 
Does contract law allow the parties to supplement the default rules governing 
renegotiation with additional terms of their own?  Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this 
question is generally “no.”  Justice Cardozo’s 1919 opinion in Beatty v. Guggenheim 
Exploration Co. provides a classic example of the rule and its underlying rationale: “Those who 
make a contract, may unmake it.  The clause which forbids a change, may be changed like any 
other . . . .  ‘Every such agreement is ended by the new one which contradicts it.’  . . .  What is 
excluded by one act, is restored by another.  You may put it out by the door, it is back through 
 
11 As Richard Posner explained in a 1990 judicial opinion:  “[T]here is often an interval in the life of a 
contract during which one party is at the mercy of the other.  A may have ordered a machine from B that 
A wants to place in operation on a given date [and] may have made commitments to his customers that it 
would be costly to renege on.  As the date of scheduled delivery approaches, B may be tempted to 
demand that A agree to renegotiate the contract price, knowing that A will incur heavy expenses if B fails 
to deliver on time.  A can always refuse to renegotiate, relying instead on his right to sue B for breach of 
contract if B fails to make delivery by the agreed date.  But legal remedies are always costly and 
uncertain.”  (United States v. Stump Home Specialties, Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1121-22.)  
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the window.  Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to 
contract again.”  (122 N.E. 378, 387-88.) 
While existing contract law thus prohibits enforcement of contractual agreements not to 
renegotiate, a natural question is whether a contrary rule would be of any effect.  Any clause 
limiting or prohibiting renegotiation will be effective only if some party to the contract has an 
incentive to enforce the clause.  Jolls (1997) provides discussion of circumstances in which this 
will be the case.  Consistent with the discussion here, the law has started to move away from the 
formalistic principle described above and in some instances now permits parties by contract to 
remove their future power to renegotiate their original contract orally (although written 
renegotiated agreements are still always enforceable) (Uniform Commercial Code sec. 2-209).   
 
4.5  The Content of Consumer Protection Law
12
A final illustration of behavioral law and economics reveals the way that work in this 
area has expanded upon the traditional law and economics notion that law’s content reflects 
either efficiency or conventional rent-seeking.  The notion that laws emerge from these two 
considerations would probably strike most citizens as odd.  Instead, most members of society – 
which is to say most of the people who are entitled to elect legislators – believe that the primary 
purpose of the law is to codify “right” and “wrong.”  Can this idea be formalized, drawing in part 
on the notion of bounded self-interest from section 3.3 above? 
Consider the case of consumer protection law, which imposes bans on certain market 
transactions including (in many jurisdictions) “usurious” lending and some forms of price 
 
12 This subsection is an abridged version of section III of Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998).  
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gouging (see, e.g., Uniform Consumer Credit Code sec. 2.201).  What accounts for these laws, 
which impose constraints on gain-producing transactions for ordinary commodities such as 
television sets and lumber?  The bans seem difficult to justify on efficiency grounds; rules 
prohibiting mutually beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities are not generally thought 
to have a large claim to efficiency.  The laws also do not generally seem well explained in terms 
of conventional rent seeking by a politically powerful faction.
13   
By contrast, laws banning usurious lending and price gouging when such activities are 
prevalent are a straightforward prediction of the theory of bounded self-interest described above. 
(The analysis here assumes that self-interested legislators are responsive to citizens’ or other 
actors’ fairness-based demands for the content of law.
14)  In the case of such bans, the 
transaction in question is a significant departure from the usual terms of trade in the market for 
the good in question – that is, a significant departure from the “reference transaction.”  The 
account above of bounded self-interest suggests that if trades are occurring frequently in a given 
jurisdiction at terms far from those of the reference transaction, there will be strong pressure for 
a law banning such trades.  Note that the prediction is not that all high prices (ones that make it 
difficult or impossible for some people to afford things they might want) will be banned; the 
 
13 Although it may be possible to offer efficiency or conventional rent-seeking explanations for certain 
sorts of laws banning economic transactions (E. Posner 1995), there does not seem to be a general theory 
or set of theories that can explain all or even most of these laws on traditional grounds. 
14 Thus, like traditional economic analysis, the behavioral law and economics approach described here 
views legislators as maximizers interested in their own reelection; legislators interested in their own 
reelection will be responsive to the preferences and judgments of their constituents and those of powerful 
interest groups.  If constituents believe that a certain practice is unfair, and should be banned, self-
interested legislators will respond, even if they do not share these views.  Likewise, if a mobilized group 
holds such views, then legislators’ response will be affected, in much the same way as if the group sought 
legislation to serve a narrowly defined financial self-interest, as posited by the traditional economic 
account.  “Fairness entrepreneurs” may play a role, mobilizing public judgments to serve their (selfish or 
nonselfish) interests.  Of course, it is also possible that legislators themselves act on their own personal 
conceptions of fairness.  
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prediction is that transactions at terms far from the terms on which those transactions generally 
occur in the marketplace will be banned. 
Consider this example:  
A store has been sold out of the popular Cabbage Patch dolls for a month.  A 
week before Christmas a single doll is discovered in a store room. The managers 
know that many customers would like to buy the doll. They announce over the 
store’s public address system that the doll will be sold by auction to the customer 
who offers to pay the most.  (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a:735.) 
 
Nearly three-quarters of the respondents judged this action to be either somewhat unfair or very 
unfair, though, of course, an economic analysis would judge the auction the most efficient 
method of assuring that the doll goes to the person who values it most.  Although the auction is 
efficient, it represents a departure from the “reference transaction,” under which the doll is sold 
at its usual price.   
As in the doll example, if money is loaned to individuals at a rate of interest significantly 
greater than the rate at which similarly-sized loans are made to other customers, then the lender’s 
behavior may be viewed as unfair.  Likewise, because lumber generally tends to sell for a 
particular price, sales at far higher prices in the wake of (say) a hurricane, which drives demand 
sky high, are thought unfair.  How then should popular items be rationed?  Subjects in one study 
asked whether a football team should allocate its few remaining tickets to a key game through an 
auction thought that this approach would be unfair, while allocation based on who waited in line 
longest was the preferred solution (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986b:S287-88).  Of course, 
waiting in line for scarce goods is precisely what happens with laws against price gouging.  
Thus, pervasive fairness norms appear to shape attitudes (and hence possibly law) on both usury 
and price gouging.  While “[c]onventional economic analyses assume as a matter of course that 
excess demand for a good creates an opportunity for suppliers to raise prices” and that “[t]he  
33 
profit-seeking adjustments that clear the market are . . . as natural as water finding its level – and 
as ethically neutral,”  “[t]he lay public does not share this indifference” (Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler 1986a:735).   
Note that the behavioral law and economics analysis does not imply that these views of 
fairness are necessarily rational or compelling.  Many of those who think “usurious” lenders are 
“unfair” might not have thought through the implications of their views (for example, that paying 
an outrageous price for a loan may be better than paying an infinite price, or that a loan to a 
riskier borrower is a product different in kind from a loan to a safer borrower).  Still, if such 
views are widespread, they may underlie certain patterns in the content of law, such as the legal 
restrictions on usury and price gouging.  The claim here is a positive one about the content of the 
law we observe, not a prescriptive or normative one about the shape practices or rules should 
take.  As a positive matter, behavioral law and economics predicts that if trades are occurring 
with some frequency on terms far from those of the reference transaction, then legal rules will 
often ban trades on such terms. 
Of course, further inquiry would be needed to offer a definitive explanation for the full 
pattern of usury and price gouging laws we observe.  Usury seems to be broadly prohibited, so 
one is not faced with the question of why we observe bans in some states but not others.  The 
same cannot be said of price gouging, which is prohibited only in certain states.  Price gouging 
appears to be prohibited primarily by states that have recently experienced (or whose neighbors 
have recently experienced) natural disasters; but more in-depth research would be required to 




5.  Debiasing Through Law 
The applications described in section 4 illustrate the usual approach in behavioral law and 
economics work to date:  the analysis identifies a departure from unbounded rationality, 
willpower or self-interest and then offers either a proposed legal reform or an account of existing 
law that takes as a fixed point the identified departure from unbounded rationality, willpower or 
self-interest.  This approach might be said to focus on designing legal rules and institutions so 
that legal outcomes do not fall prey to problems of bounded rationality, willpower or self-interest 
– a strategy of insulation of those outcomes from such bounds on human behavior.   
A quite different possibility, focused most heavily on the case of judgment errors by 
boundedly rational actors, is that legal policy may respond best to such errors not by structuring 
rules and institutions to protect legal outcomes from the effects of the errors (which themselves 
are taken as a given), but instead by operating directly on the errors and attempting to help 
people either to reduce or to eliminate them.  Legal policy in this category may be termed 
“debiasing through law”; the law is used to reduce the degree of biased behavior actors exhibit 
(Jolls and Sunstein 2006a).  The primary emphasis is on judgment errors rather than either other 
aspects of bounded rationality or bounded willpower or self-interest, for the simple reason that 
those alternative forms of human behavior cannot uncontroversially be viewed as “biases” in 
need of debiasing.  (Recall, for instance, the normative complexities discussed above in 
connection with both the endowment effect and bounded willpower.  And clearly it would not 
generally be desirable to “debias” boundedly self-interested actors.)  As described below, the 
basic promise of strategies for debiasing through law is that these strategies will often provide a 
middle ground between unyielding adherence to the assumptions of traditional economics, on the  
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one hand, and the usual behavioral law and economics approach of accepting departures from 
those assumptions as a given, on the other. 
 
5.1  Debiasing Through Substantive and Procedural Law  
The idea of debiasing through law draws on a substantial existing psychology literature 
on the debiasing of individuals after a demonstration of the existence of a given judgment error 
(e.g., Fischhoff 1982; Weinstein and Klein 2002).  Those who have investigated debiasing in 
experimental settings, however, have generally not explored the possibility of achieving 
debiasing through law.  A few behavioral law and economics papers have examined the 
possibility of debiasing through the procedural rules governing adjudication by judges or juries; 
a well-known example builds on the studies described in section 4.2 above of self-serving bias in 
litigation and shows how requiring litigants to consider reasons the adjudicator might rule 
against them eliminates their self-serving bias (Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff 1997).  
However, the potential promise of debiasing through law is far broader, for it is not only the 
procedures by which law is applied in adjudicative settings but the actual substance of law that 
may be employed to achieve debiasing. 
Consider an example of debiasing through law developed by Jolls (2006), drawing on the 
work on implicit racial or other group-based bias described in 1.3.1.1 above.  Might substantive 
rules governing employment discrimination play a role in debiasing individuals who exhibit such 
bias?  Empirical studies suggest that implicit racial or other group-based bias is profoundly 
influenced by environmental stimuli.  Individuals who view pictures of Tiger Woods and 
Timothy McVeigh before submitting to testing of implicit racial bias, for example, exhibit 
substantially less bias than individuals not exposed to the pictures of Woods and McVeigh  
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(Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001).  This study and, more broadly, the large social science 
literature on debiasing in response to implicit racial or other group-based bias (e.g., Macrae, 
Bodenhausen and Milne 1995; Dasgupta and Asgari 2004) have an intriguing practical 
counterpart in the ongoing controversies at many universities and the U.S. Capitol over the 
frequent pattern of largely or exclusively white, male portraits adorning classrooms and 
ceremonial spaces (Gewertz 2003; Stolberg 2003).  In the employment context, it may not be 
irrelevant to the degree of implicit racial or other group-based bias found in employment 
decisionmakers whether, for instance, the walls of the workplace feature sexually explicit 
depictions of women – the source of frequent sexual harassment lawsuits – or instead feature 
more positive, affirming images of women.  Employment discrimination law’s policing of what 
can and cannot be featured in the workplace environment, described in detail in Jolls (2006), is 
thus an illustration of debiasing through substantive law. 
It is important to emphasize the limits of the domain of this analysis of employment 
discrimination law as a mechanism for achieving “debiasing” in the sense in which the term is 
used here.  In some cases racial or other group-based bias may reflect genuine tastes rather than, 
as discussed above, a divergence of implicit attitudes and behavior from non-discriminatory 
tastes.  Of course, the features of employment discrimination law just referenced might still be 
desirable, and would certainly remain applicable, in the case of consciously discriminatory 
tastes, but they would no longer illustrate a form of debiasing through law in the sense used here 




15 For further discussion of normative issues in debiasing through law, see Jolls and Sunstein (2006a, 
2006b).  
37 
5.2  General Typology of Strategies for Debiasing Through Law 
The example of debiasing through employment discrimination law and the earlier 
example from Babcock, Issacharoff and Loewenstein’s work of debiasing through restructuring 
the adjudicative process together illustrate the basic distinction between debiasing through 
substantive law and debiasing through procedural rules.  Figure 1 generalizes the point by 
mapping the terrain of strategies for debiasing through law more fully.  The column division 
marks the line between procedural rules governing the adjudicative process and substantive rules 
regulating actions taken outside of the adjudicative process.  The row division marks the line 
between debiasing actors in their capacity as participants in the adjudicative process and 
debiasing actors in their capacity as decision makers outside of the adjudicative process.  The 
upper left box in this matrix represents the type of debiasing through law on which the prior 
work on such debiasing has focused: the rules in question are procedural rules governing the 
adjudicative process, and the actors targeted are individuals in their capacity as participants in 
the adjudicative process (Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff 1997; Peters 1999). 
Moving counterclockwise, the lower left box in the matrix is marked with an “X” 
because procedural rules governing the adjudicative process do not have any obvious role in 
debiasing actors outside of the adjudicative process – although they these rules certainly may 
affect such actors’ behavior in various ways by influencing what would happen in the event of 
future litigation.  The lower right box in the matrix represents the category of debiasing through 
law emphasized in Jolls (2006) and Jolls and Sunstein (2006a, 2006b): the rules in question are 
substantive rules regulating actions taken outside of the adjudicative process, and the actors 
targeted are decision makers outside of the adjudicative process.  
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Figure 1: Typology of Strategies for Debiasing Through Law 
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Role of Actor 
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 Debiasing  through 
substantive law 
 
Finally, the upper right corner of the matrix represents a hybrid category that warrants 
brief discussion, in part to demarcate it from the category (just discussed) of debiasing through 
substantive law.  In this hybrid category, it is substantive, rather than procedural, law that is 
structured to achieve debiasing, but the judgment error that this debiasing effort targets is one 
that arises within, rather than outside of, the adjudicative process.  For example, Ward 
Farnsworth’s (2003) work on self-serving bias suggests that such bias on the part of employment 
discrimination litigants (actors in their capacity as participants in an adjudicative process) might 
be reduced by restructuring employment discrimination standards (substantive rules regulating 
action outside of the adjudicative process) to increase the reliance of such standards on objective 
facts as opposed to subjective or normative judgments.  This type of debiasing through law 
operates through reform of substantive law rather than procedural rules, but the actions to be  
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debiased are those of litigants within the adjudicative process.  In the case of debiasing through 
substantive law, by contrast, both the legal rules through which debiasing occurs and the 
capacities in which actors are targeted for debiasing are distinct from the context of the 
adjudicative process.   
 
7. Conclusion 
In Richard Thaler’s view, the ultimate sign of success for behavioral economics will be 
that what is now behavioral economics will become simply “economics.”  The same observation 
applies to behavioral law and economics.  But a potential barrier to reaching this outcome has 
been the frequency with which behavioral law and economics has recommended paternalistically 
overriding people’s ability to make choices (Rachlinski 2003).  For instance, as described in 
section 4.3 above, a prominent behavioral law and economics article praises the wisdom of the 
“business judgment” rule in corporate law notwithstanding the fact that this rule removes from 
the hands of judges and juries the power to hold corporate actors liable under the ordinary legal 
standard of negligence.  Debiasing through law, discussed in section 5, holds the potential to be a 
path out of the perennial law and economics dilemma over paternalistic restrictions on choice 
because debiasing through law strategies can recognize human limitations while at the same time 
avoiding the step of removing choices from people’s hands.  Because debiasing through law 
cannot be applied in every context, however, future work in behavioral law and economics 
should also seek to refine and strengthen analyses concerned with structuring legal rules in light 
of the remaining (post-debiasing) departures from traditional economic assumptions of 
unbounded rationality, willpower and self-interest.  
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